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how the ‘taming’ of private education in china is
impacting ai
Jeremy Knox
Following the theme of this issue of On Education, this paper suggests that one of the most
significant and recent examples of ‘taming’ educational technologies occurred in China this year,
involving national policy directives aimed at regulating both technology companies and the private
education sector. This ‘taming’, it will be argued below, has particular and significant implications
for the development of artificial intelligence (AI) for education in China, principally due to the
way in which this burgeoning field has developed in relation to private educational provision. The
following sections will outline key government policies, and assess the extent to which state
regulation is impacting the ways such technologies are designed and deployed in the Chinese
education system.
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Introduction
The announcement of government policy in China has attracted a lot of attention in western
countries, largely due to the perception that such directives, issued by a one-party state, signal
imminent and comprehensive change in ways unachievable elsewhere. Additionally, China’s
prominence in the global economy, and the substantial international networks of investors involved
in Chinese companies, often mean that the promise of impending regulatory shifts becomes
mainstream news. Two recent and prominent examples of policy regulation in China illustrate this
fascination, and provide crucial insight into the relationships between government policy, AI
development, and education. These two policies are: the ‘State Council’s National Strategy for AI
Development’ published in 2017, and the ‘Opinions on Further Reducing the Work Burden of
Students in Compulsory Education and the Burden of Off-campus Training’, announced in 2021.
These two policies are indicative of, firstly, the way that the Chinese state drives AI development
through a process of incentivisation, and secondly, the power of the government to apply severe
regulations that profoundly impact the ways AI is designed and deployed in educational contexts. In
a general sense, the first of the policies identified above signalled a broad authorisation of private
sector involvement in the advancement of AI, and can be understood as incentivising specific
developments in education. In somewhat of a contrast, the second policy was specifically aimed at
regulating private education in China, and given that it is from this sector that the most significant
examples of educational AI applications have been developed, the directive can be understood as
instigating some potentially fundamental shifts in the ways such technologies are designed and
deployed in the Chinese education system. Nevertheless, while both these policies are suggested to
be particularly significant, it is with caution that such documents should be seen as straightforward
representations of how the field is developing. To assume that Chinese policy straightforwardly
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results in uniform and comprehensive national transformation is to overlook, not only the substantial
regional differences that exist in the country, but also the less overt interplay between central
directives and ‘on the ground’ local interpretations and implementations, often involving private
sector interests.
A ‘National Strategy’ and the incentivising of AI for education
The ‘State Council’s National Strategy for AI Development1’ (hereafter NSAID) (see State Council,
2017) was published in 2017, and made a series of bold claims about the ability to achieve global
supremacy and economic might through AI by the year 2030. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the NSAID
drew a wealth of media responses and policy analysis, predominantly in the U.S. The narrative of
such responses tended towards notions of geopolitical competition through a global ‘AI arms race’
(Ghi & Srivastava, 2021), characterised by a so-called ‘cold war’ relationship between China and the
US (Thompson, 2018). As such, at least from an outside perspective, the NSAID appeared to
establish China as a substantial competitor in an international field of so-called ‘AI superpowers’
(Lee, 2018), and straightforwardly produce a ‘top-down’, policy-driven sense of ‘national AI
capacity’. In contrast, understanding how this policy functioned within China is a more productive
way of examining the significance of the NSAID, both for the development of such technologies
generally, and for the specific impact on education. Rather than understanding the policy in terms of
the centralised governance of AI, and indeed notions of national uniformity and coherence which
tend to underpin outside assumptions about China, its internal functioning can be understood in
terms of incentivisation. Roberts et al. make this clear, suggesting that the NSAID ‘is not meant to
act as a centrally enacted initiative’, but rather ‘functions as a stamp of approval for de-risking and
actively incentivising local projects that make use of AI’ (2021, p. 61). They further suggest that the
policy is ‘an ambitious strategy set by the central government, but the actual innovation and
transformation is expected to be driven by the private sector and local governments’ (Roberts et al.,
2021, p. 61). In this sense, the NSAID can be seen, not as establishing any kind of ‘national AI
capability’ – which Ding and Costigan suggest to be ‘such a fuzzy concept’ (2019, p. 27), but rather
as the attempt to endorse and incite local networks of public and private organisations to
independently utilise and produce AI. Nevertheless, the policy is certainly representative of an
explicit interest in catalysing technological development in China, and a view within the central
leadership that AI offers significant potential for both economic and geopolitical advancement.
Crucially for this discussion, it is through such an understanding that the implications for education
become clearer. The NSAID is indicative of a general government position that has established
favourable conditions for the development of AI, and the education sector has been perceived as a
ripe market for such technological innovation, particularly where start-ups working on educational
AI have received tax-breaks from the government and have been seen as a dependable option for
investors (Hao, 2019). There are claims that 60 new AI companies established themselves in China’s
private education market in 2018 alone (see Beard, 2020). Indeed, it is from the private education
sector in China – up until recently a substantial and powerful dimension of the Chinese education
system in its own right – that the most significant examples of AI in education have derived. For this
reason, it is worth briefly noting the history of the private education in China, and its recent shift to
online provision. After being re-established following the market reforms of the late 1970s, private
education underwent huge growth in the 1990s, responding to a demand for both English language
tuition and exam preparation (Lin, 1999). Crucially, this expansion derived, at least in part, from the
inability of the public education system to drive the wider economic transformation of the time (see
Wang, 2001; Sun, 2010). Further, as Wang notes, private education entrepreneurs were able ‘to
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experiment with new educational philosophies that would be impossible in the public school system’
(2001, p. 108). In describing the recruitment strategies of private education companies during this
time, Lin captures the sense of spontaneity and excitement:
They simply splashed their ads across the streets of the city or set up a booth at a heavy
intersection announcing their programs. Adopting a “guerrilla” strategy, they offered
whatever was in hot demand…The duration of their programs could be short or long,
and classes could be taken during the day or night, all depending on the needs of the
clientele. To attract enrollment, they even promised to refund fees if the students were
not satisfied’ (Lin, 1999, p. 7).
As such, it is important to emphasise the deep-seated sense of entrepreneurialism (see also Tiehua,
1996) that characterises the private education sector in China, and that underpins the more recent
development of AI. Further, it is a sector that has been long understood as able to provide
innovative educational solutions and practices as alternatives to a more traditional and restricted
public education system. Additionally important here is the more recent shift to online provision
within the private education sector, where a number of companies have developed online businesses
that, while only a small proportion of the sector as a whole, still constitute sizeable educational
endeavours, involving tens of millions of students. The significance of the shift online, mirroring the
development of AI in other areas, has been that the software platforms used – in this case to
facilitate language learning or exam preparation – have allowed their owners to collect vast amounts
of data derived from the behaviour of users. With the growing sophistication of ‘machine learning’
techniques able to make sense of such data (Alpaydin, 2016), online educational platforms have
been central in driving the development of AI in China.
Two key examples here are the private education companies ‘New Oriental’ and ‘Tomorrow
Advancing Life (TAL)’. New Oriental were founded in 1993 (right in the period of explosive
expansion in the private education sector), and, up until recently, claimed to comprise of 122
schools, 1,669 learning centres, over 54,200 teachers, 67.9 million student enrolments, and 11
bookstores (NOETG, 2015). TAL was founded in 2003, and, up until recently, comprised of 45,000
employees and 990 teaching centres (TAL, 2017). TAL is the overarching entity for a somewhat
bewildering array of sub-brands and educational products, including Xueersi, Xueersi Online
School, Izhikang, First Leap, Tipaipai, Xiaohou AI, Xiaohoucode, Aiqidao, Mamabang,
Kaoyanbang, and Shunshunliuxue (TAL, 2017). Not long after the publishing of the NSAID, in
October 2018, New Oriental announced two significant AI projects. Firstly, a strategic initiative
called ‘N-Brain’, intended to build cooperative networks across academic research institutions,
education technology businesses, and venture capital investors, and secondly, the ‘AI Class director’,
suggested to employ:
face and speech recognition, facial attributes analysis, natural language processing and
other AI tech to track each student’s class performance in real time, analyze their
emotions, participation and results in a quantitative approach, giving advice
accordingly (Qiao Lei quoted in Xu, 2018)
TAL has become a key player in the development of AI in China, not only announcing its own AI
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projects, such as the ‘AI teacher’ aimed at supporting language teaching in under-resourced areas of
China (Wang, 2019), but also taking up a central position as a ‘national AI champion’ for ‘smart
education’ (Larsen, 2019; Wernberg-Tougaard, 2021). In particular, this position situates TAL as a
powerful actor across government and the private sector, to set national standards for educational AI
development, and ultimately govern the kind of technologies and initiatives that emerge in China.
Other notable examples of AI applications include an adaptive learning system developed by
Squirrel AI2 which is deployed across more than 1700 private learning centres in China. The
apparent success of Squirrel AI’s system has allowed the company to develop into a significant
international player, establishing a research laboratory in New York, as well as research
collaborations with Carnegie Mellon University and UC-Berkeley3. Furthermore, companies such as
VIPKid4 and Yuanfudao5 demonstrate the relationship between the provision of online education
and the subsequent development of AI features, both being businesses that have recently added such
technologies to their existing platform-based offerings. Yuanfudao attracted much in the way of
media attention in 2020 for reportedly being valued as the ‘world’s biggest edtech unicorn’; a
valuation which appears to be linked to its potential to develop AI from its substantial population of
‘3.7 million paid student users’ (Ghosh 2020, no page).
The key point here is that the companies able to develop prominent examples of AI, as well as adopt
influential and authoritative roles within the emerging field, have done so precisely due to already-
established positions with the private education sector, involving access to data, infrastructure,
capital, and investor networks, as well as the capacity for entrepreneurial development. The NSAID
provided the underlying incentive and authorisation for such development to flourish.
The ‘Double Reduction’ and the ‘taming’ of the private sector
The powerful position that the private education sector had developed in the previous 30 years of
continued market-reforms in China (one estimate is of a sector worth $100 billion – see Bloomberg,
2021a) became the target of stringent regulation in 2021, with the announcement of the ‘Opinions
on Further Reducing the Work Burden of Students in Compulsory Education and the Burden of
Off-campus Training’ (MoE, 2021). Published on the 24th of July, and commonly referred to as
‘double reduction’ (shuangjian), the policy detailed a number of regulations regarding the status and
practices of private education companies, which many have interpreted as a fundamental overhaul
of the sector (for example Che, 2021). Perhaps the most striking aspect of the ‘double reduction’
was the prohibition of all capital operations. In other words, no private education companies were to
be permitted to make profits, and had to further register as non-profit organisations. This was likely
the central factor in the widely-reported collapse of the market value of key private education
companies. For example, TAL’s shares reportedly fell by 70.8%, New Oriental’s by 54.2% (E.
Cheng, 2021).  Nevertheless, there were other notable regulations, such as the barring of foreign
investors, which for companies such as TAL and New Oriental who were substantially intertwined
within international investor networks, presented significant obstacles to organisational functioning.
Other aspects appeared oriented towards regulation of the market, such as prohibiting ‘monopolies’,
restricting advertising, and forcing companies to standardise and make their pricing public (Ma,
2021). Yet further stipulations appear to express a genuine concern for students, through the
prohibition of private tuition on weekends and evenings (MoE, 2021). Such regulation
acknowledges what has long been considered a highly competitive state education system in China,
and the extent to which the private education industry has exploited the anxiety caused by the
somewhat infamous Gaokao, or university entrance examination. Haiping suggests that ‘[t]he
average amount spent on extracurricular tutoring per student doubled between 2016 and 2018, to
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nearly 5,000 yuan’ (2021, no page). As such, Haiping terms the private sector a ‘shadow education’
in China, that ‘exacerbates the problems of the country’s test-oriented education system’ and is
becoming ‘a key mechanism for maintaining and reinforcing social classes’ (2021, no page). It is
important, therefore, to recognise the ways in which AI technologies function to reinforce and
maintain the test-oriented education system in China, rather than assuming that the technology is a
route to making the Gaokao obsolete, as some AI proponents outside of China have suggested (see
Beard, 2020). Ma, (2021) provides a further detailed breakdown of the ‘double reduction’
regulations, categorised according to whether companies provide exam training or not, as well as
whether restrictions apply specifically to online and/or offline provision. This later distinction
reveals some interesting foci; for example, while ‘training’ is prohibited during weekends and
holidays for all categories, further restrictions on the length and scheduling of courses apply to
online provision exclusively (such courses are limited to 30 minutes, and can be offered no later
than 9pm) (Ma, 2021). Notably, despite this latter restriction, the Ministry of Education have
themselves pledged to provide free online educational resources nationwide, ‘in an effort to ensure
education equity for all’ (Dandan, 2021a, no page).
At the time of writing, three months since the publication of the ‘double reduction’ policy, it is as
yet unclear how the restrictions outlined above will ultimately impact education in China. Loss of
jobs within the sector is one apparent outcome, indicated by the recent announcement of the
creation of 10,300 new jobs by city officials in Beijing, ranging across teaching, management, and
marketing (Xinyu, 2021), presumably relocating such educational professionals into the state sector.
Somewhat bizarrely, New Oriental recently announced plans to develop ‘an online marketplace for
agriculture products’ (Wu, 2021), as a way of making up for the losses incurred by the regulation.
There are also indications of a range of ‘tactics to avoid scrutiny’ (Dandan, 2021b, no page) on the
part of private tuition companies, including reducing their size, changing the way the business is
registered, or offering classes, ostensibly, to parents rather than their children. More pertinent to this
discussion is the potential impact of the ‘double reduction’ policy on the development and
deployment of AI in education in China. Two possible and interrelated outcomes will be suggested
here.
Firstly, given the restrictions on the provision of private tutoring, there is evidence that some
companies are shifting towards simply supplying AI-driven products, with which students are
expected to self-direct their learning. As such, private education companies would avoid the
provision of tuition, as they have done previously through dedicated ‘learning centres’ often
involving a combination of class and individual teaching, alongside a one-to-one engagement with
AI-driven software. One significant example here is Squirrel AI’s announcement of a ‘learning
machine’, in the form of a tablet or computer loaded with the company’s adaptive learning system
and resources (see Y. Cheng, 2021). Thus, rather than offering their AI technology as part of a
broader package of training, usually involving attendance at a specific learning centre and some
form of tuition and support from on-site teachers, the ‘learning machines’ are designed to be
products that are sold to customers for their own use. There are indications that the development of
dedicated tablets is being adopted by other education companies in direct response to the ‘double
reduction’ policy, such as UMeWorld who provide English language tuition under the brand ‘Easy
Learn’ (see Bloomberg, 2021b). The relatively short time in which such ‘learning machines’ have
been produced and deployed following the recent policy shift may reflect what others have termed
‘China speed’ (Zhong & Krosinsky, 2020); in part, a reference to the ability to rapidly respond to
changing economic conditions, drawing on significant technological infrastructure. Nevertheless, the
educational implications of this shift are profound. First and foremost, the assumption that tuition is
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not being provided through the selling of computers pre-loaded with AI-driven software reveals
significant assumptions about the nature of technology as ‘an independent realm of pure technical
and scientific law’ (Hamilton and Friesen, 2013). In other words, what is substantially overlooked is
the idea that tuition is very much in-built within the AI systems used for so-called ‘adaptive’ or
‘personalised’ learning, and the notion that data-driven-software is replete with human decision-
making. For example, human decision-making about what kind of data is collected, or how user-
behaviour is assumed to relate to learning are fundamental, structured-in elements of the ways AI
functions. To assume that the independent use of an AI device somehow removes the element of
human tuition, derives from a very impoverished, but rather widespread, understanding of the
relationships between society and technology. As Bayne suggests, this ‘bracketing-off of technology
from social activity is expressive of a more fundamental division of society from technology which
is widespread within the field of digital education’ (2015, p9). Furthermore, this potential shift
towards the provision of tablet devices for independent use, as opposed to more integrated
arrangements involving both class peers and teachers, appears to further entrench the idea that the
learning relationship with AI is ‘one-to-one’. As Friesen (2020) has noted, the claim of the
advantageous ‘one-to-one’ relationship with AI is not only widespread amongst advocates of such
technologies, but is based on problematic renditions of ‘authentic’ teaching and learning throughout
(European) history. In other words, the educational benefits of a ‘one-to-one’ relationship with AI, in
which students study independently and without any input from trained teachers, or indeed their
peers, is highly contested, and appears in the case of recent ‘learning machines’ in China to be more
directly related to the ‘double reduction’ policy than any particular pedagogical rationale. The
provision of contained ‘learning machines’ seems to not only conceal the continued involvement of
human decision-making in the design and deployment of educational AI, but also to reduce
opportunities for ‘humans in the loop’ where learning with such systems take place.
The second, and related, outcome of the ‘double reduction’ policy is the potential shift of AI-driven
systems, away from a previously unregulated private sector, and towards the state school system.
Perhaps the most obvious impact of the recent policy shift is that private education companies will
have to seek alternative markets, and the public education sector appears as the most immediate
substitute, particularly where such companies are able to re-brand themselves as providers of AI
products, software, and services. The production of ‘learning machines’ seems orchestrated with this
potential move in mind, where states schools, and in particular those located in under-resourced
areas, may see investment in such systems as a viable alternative to a lack of trained teachers.
Previously, AI systems, specifically in the area of ‘essay grading’ have been deployed in state schools
in what appears to be an experimental fashion, both in the sense of testing the quality of the
technology, as well as in terms of building data-sets from populations of students (Chen, 2018; Ma,
2020). However, despite sizable initiatives – for example an essay grading system deployed in
60,000 schools (see Chen, 2018), such examples of AI have been somewhat confined to particular
experimental projects. The ‘double reduction’, it is suggested here, may lead to a more uniform and
more widespread deployment of AI in state schools, as private education companies seek to market
specific data-driven products for public educational institutions. Squirrel AI, for example, have
offered such services in the past, claiming to have served 60,000 public schools across 1,200 cities
(Y. Cheng, 2021). However, it is the combination of recent education policy that suggests the
potential for a more substantial shift. Two recent policies published by the State Council are
significant here: the ‘Education Modernisation 2035 Plan’ (State Council, 2019) and the ‘Overall
Plan for Deepening Educational Evaluation Reform in the New Era’ (henceforth DEERNE) (MoE,
2020), both of which emphasise the need for data-driven technologies to underpin the ways schools
and universities are developed. Published in 2019, the ‘Education Modernisation 2035 Plan’, sets out
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a broad range of long-term aims, including to ‘accelerate educational reform in the information age’,
through the building of ‘smart’ campuses and the ‘the construction of an integrated intelligent
teaching, management and service platform’ (State Council 2019, no page). The policy further calls
for ‘the formation of a modern education management and monitoring system’ and the promotion of
‘precision management and scientific decision-making’ (State Council 2019, no page), alluding to
the use of data-driven technologies for education governance. This is emphasised by the DEERNE
policy published just a year later, which directly specifies the development of ‘modern information
technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data’ to:
explore and carry out the longitudinal evaluation of the whole process of students’
learning in all grades, and the horizontal evaluation of all elements of morality,
intelligence, physical education, and labor. (MoE, 2020, no page).
As such, AI appears to be a significant priority for the state in its efforts to reform public education
in China, not only in the sense of the classroom-based ‘adaptive’ or ‘personalised’ systems currently
developed by private education companies, but also in terms of a broader vision for interconnected
platforms and data-driven educational governance. Given the state’s previous attempts to amplify
‘national AI capability’ through the unbridling of private enterprise, such a vision my entail the
significant involvement of established education companies and their already-successful
technologies.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the extent to which recent policy regulations regarding the private
education sector in China may act to ‘tame’ the development of educational AI. The context for this
discussion was the ‘State Council’s National Strategy for AI Development’ published in 2017, which
signalled a broad government incentivisation of such technology, and a particular endorsement of
the private sector as driving force for the production of AI for education. While private education
companies have become central players in the development of educational AI in China, the ‘double
reduction’ policy announced in the summer of 2021 appeared to signal the downfall of the sector, by
prohibiting capital operations and banning foreign investors, amongst a raft of other stringent
regulations. However, rather than hindering the development of AI in education, the ‘double
reduction’ policy appears to have diverted efforts towards the creation of new kinds of marketable
products, and focused more attention on the public education sector. The adoption of more AI
technologies in state schools and universities, perhaps supplied or co-developed by existing private
education companies, would constitute the most significant impact of the ‘double reduction’ policy.
However, it is important to note that such a move would potentially bring AI systems under more
government scrutiny and regulation, as technologies developed in a largely unfettered way for the
private sector become increasingly embroiled in regional and national education politics.
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